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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
“There are two categories for the things that are counterfeited. 
There is everything and there is anything…” (interview with 
Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit Officer).  
 
The trade in counterfeit and pirated goods is stated to be one of the fastest growing businesses 
in the world (Lin, 2011). The World Trade Organisation estimates that 7% of all global 
commerce is counterfeit (UNODC, 2015). The World Economic Forum goes further, 
suggesting that in 2015 counterfeiting and piracy equated to 10% of the global trade in 
merchandise, costing the global economy $1.77 trillion (World Economic Forum, 2015: 3; see 
also UNODC, 2015). We must acknowledge that, of course, no one knows the scale of 
counterfeit trade, and there are problems with the estimates – when faked goods are valued 
as directly losing the value of the originals, which assumes all purchasers of counterfeits would 
have bought a full price original, and more generally a reliance on heroic estimates from 
reputable bodies and a tendency for large estimates to trump smaller ones (Andreas 2010; 
see also Intellectual Property Office, 2017). Despite the caveats, it is reasonably safe to accept 
the international law enforcement agencies’ view that the trade in counterfeit and pirated 
goods is now one of the world’s most profitable illicit markets. 
Product counterfeiting takes place in a number of dimensions, which include safety 
critical and non-safety critical goods, deceptive and non-deceptive counterfeits, and high and 
low-quality fakes. The level of imitation and intellectual property (IP) infringement can also 
vary from the unauthorized use of a brand name, to the use of intentionally incorrect names 
and logos that resemble a brand or the unauthorized sale of a legitimately produced designer 
product (see Lin, 2011: 5). Indeed, ‘counterfeiting’ has become catch-all phrase used to 
encompass the illicit production and distribution of goods and packaging that infringe 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). The category includes patents, trademarks and copyrights, 
as well as poor quality and fake goods which use ‘fake brands’ created by the counterfeiters 
themselves and therefore do not involve IP infringement (Shen, 2017). In some instances it 
can be useful to situate the production and distribution of fake goods in their respective legal 
categories, which include counterfeiting (goods violating a trademark, design rights or patent), 
piracy (tangible goods violating a copyright), imitations, grey area products and custom-made 
copies (Prendergast et al. 2002 in Gessler, 2009:36). This is the focus of this book, though we 
shall clearly show how other forms of illicit and licit trade become entangled within that ambit 
– as when counterfeit trade is compounded by customs misdeclaration or plain old smuggling 
to evade duties, which can also involve original products, and trade based money laundering 
for instance.  
As the opening quote suggests, the scope of product counterfeiting covers virtually 
every type of commodity.1 Statistics on seizures of tangible goods suggest burgeoning 
markets in both non-safety-critical goods such as jewellery and watches, handbags and 
luggage, sports goods, clothing and footwear (Wall and Large, 2010), as well as safety-critical 
goods that can pose a significant risk to consumers, including food, alcohol (see Lord et al., 
2017; Shen, 2017; Shen and Antonopoulos, 2016), tobacco (Shen et al., 2010), children’s’ 
toys and games, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016), pesticides, 
defence/military equipment (Sullivan and Wilson, 2016), electrical equipment and appliances, 
and car and aeroplane parts (Yar, 2005). Official knowledge indicates that if we look at the 
market in fast moving consumer goods for instance, then 6.5% of all sports(wear) goods, 7.8% 
of cosmetics and 12.7% of luggage/handbags sold in the EU are in some way counterfeit 
(Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, 2014; 2015).  
The seriousness of harms associated with counterfeit products tends to be ignored or 
underestimated. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) suggests that the infiltration 
of counterfeit goods in the legal supply chain ‘creates enormous drain on the global economy, 
crowding out billions in legitimate economic activity and facilitating an “underground economy” 
that deprives government of revenues for vital public services, forces higher burdens on tax 
payers, dislocates hundreds of thousands of legitimate jobs and exposes consumers to 
dangerous and ineffective products’ (ICC, 2011:1). As we shall show different modalities of 
counterfeiting create one or all of these effects. But it is worth contrasting the popular 
discourse that it is ‘fun’ choosing cheap imitations, with the number of international cases that 
highlight the serious health risks associated with counterfeit safety-critical goods. Recent 
examples include the 45 percent of road fatalities in Oman that can be attributed to counterfeit 
spare parts in 2012 alone (Interpol, 2014) and estimates claiming that the trade in counterfeit, 
falsified and substandard medicines is responsible for the death of up to one million people 
worldwide every year (Southwick, 2013; Ossola, 2015; see also IRACM, 2013; Hall and 
Antonopoulos, 2016; Hall et al. 2017). It is too simple though to divide counterfeiting that 
deceives the consumer and that in which they collude. In the UK, the Home Office estimates 
the social and economic costs of counterfeiting – which include lost revenue to legitimate 
business, lost revenue to the exchequer, lost jobs, and enforcement costs including criminal 
justice costs – at £400 million per annum (Mills et al., 2013). All too clearly, knowledge of such 
                                                          
1 The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) identifies 12 categories of counterfeited 
products: 1. Foodstuff, alcoholic and other beverages; 2. Body care items; 3. Clothing and accessories; 
4. Shoes including parts and accessories; 5. Personal accessories; 6.Mobile phones including parts 
and technical accessories; 7. Electrical/electronic and other equipment; 8. CD/DVD, cassette, game 
cartridges; 9. Toys, games (including electronic game consoles, and sporting articles; 10. Tobacco 
products; 11. Medical products; 12. Other products (e.g. labels, tags, stickers, packaging material, 
vehicles including accessories and parts).  
economic costs and social harms depend on a number of contextual variables such as the 
reporting and recording of incidents, the level of intensity of law enforcement and the priorities 
of various state agencies. 
 In recognition of the sheer volume of fake goods permeating various markets, 
regulatory and law enforcement agencies are paying increasing attention to product 
counterfeiting. However, outside of studies associating the revenue streams of counterfeit 
markets with the activities of violent groups in conflict2, little is known about the everyday 
financial management of the counterfeit trade. Whilst flows of counterfeit goods involved in 
the trade have been placed under academic and popular scrutiny, financial mechanisms that 
enable these flows have largely escaped attention. For instance, Chaudhry and Zimmerman’s 
(2008) conceptual framework does not mention finance in either trading environment or kinds 
of remedial actions undertaken (see also Chaudhry, 2017). This is despite the fact that over 
the last two decades official and media discourses have paid increasing attention to ‘organised 
crime’ finances in general, often portraying crime-money as a corruptive force, a threat to 
social life and the stability of national and global financial systems (for a critique see van Duyne 
& Levi, 2005; Reuter, 2013; see also Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2018).  
Yet these accounts have little to say about the everyday nature and dynamics of 
‘criminal’ investment practices, and research on the financial management of illegal markets 
and other manifestations of ‘organised crime’ remains limited. Although considerable work has 
been done on the disposal of the proceeds of crime, global money laundering (Schneider, 
2012; 2016) and the financing of terrorism (e.g. Levi, 2010a; Silke, 2000), little has been done 
in terms of analysing the individuals, structures and processes involved in the 'preceeds' of 
crime (Levi, 2010b: 38; see also Reuter, 1985; Moneyval, 2005; Petrunov, 2011; Kruisbergen 
et al., 2012; Soudijn and Zhang, 2013). Indeed, as the Head of Europol’s Financial Intelligence 
Unit noted in an event held at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice in 2015, “very little is 
known about the financial management of organised crime…” (Navarrete, 2015). This is 
surprising given the fact that financing is a horizontal issue for all illicit markets (Hicks, 2015: 
1). One exception is the Financing of Organised Crime Project (CSD, 2015), which specifically 
                                                          
2 Counterfeiting has been linked with terrorist and separatist groups in Northern Ireland, Spain and 
Chechnya, as well as with Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS, who are reported to be using the revenue 
generated from the counterfeiting business as a funding source for conflict (see Union Des Fabricants, 
2016). Allegedly even the North Korean regime has been involved in the counterfeiting and international 
distribution of cigarettes and currency (see von Lampe, 2016). In the UK, it has been suggested that 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been involved in the counterfeiting of CDs, game consoles, and 
designer clothes as a means of buying arms. However, “it is unknown how much of the money 
generated by these counterfeiting operations goes to terrorist groups and how much is retained for 
criminal profits” (EUROPOL, 2013: 2). So whilst it is clear that some terror groups do use counterfeit 
goods to finance themselves, it is not the case that the majority of counterfeit trade is implicated in such 
financing – despite tendencies in the media and by lobby groups to imply it is so. 
 
focused on the processes and structures involved in financial investment and management in 
the illegal tobacco trade, cocaine market and VAT fraud across European member states (see 
also Antonopoulos and Hall, 2015; Hall and Antonopoulos, 2017). Another is the relatively 
sound understanding of finance-related issues in drug markets more generally (see Reuter et 
al., 1990; Naylor, 2004; Brå, 2007); existing work addresses prices, costs of doing business 
(Caulkins et al., 1999; Moeller, 2012), investments and money laundering. At the other end of 
the scale there is good aggregate data on the uses of legitimate trade to enable illicit flows of 
finance (e.g. Cobham et al., 2014). 
The gap in knowledge about financial management in the counterfeiting business 
raises various questions: What are the various forms and sources of financing in counterfeit 
markets? Which financial processes and practices are used by those involved in product 
counterfeiting? What (if any) interconnections exist between criminal structures involved in 
counterfeiting and legitimate businesses or financial institutions? Do information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and e-commerce markets offer enhanced financial 
opportunities for counterfeiters, and, if so, in what ways? How do these online processes 
interact with physical flows of counterfeit goods? Moreover, it raises questions about the role 
of the nature and forms of the money involved. It asks about the relationship of digital and 
physical money forms, and different quasi-money forms that might be exchanged. It also picks 
up from classic theorising about money that emphasises that it serves precisely as an abstract 
form – with Georg Simmel arguing in The Philosophy of Money the meaning of money is 
confined exclusively to its quantitative sum and that only money is ‘free from any quality and 
exclusively determined by quantity’ (2004: 210, 301). Money means only that which it can 
purchase and dissolves its own traces and origins. This cleansing effect is a sentiment echoed 
in Paul Stoller’s (2002) work on West African crafts commodified and turned into art in New 
York, where a Muslim trader sells what are, to him, idolatrous images, and reinvests the money 
in paying for more to be made, in order to feed his family; for him ‘money has no smell’. Money 
derived from illicit trades such as counterfeiting clearly walks a tightrope, of seeking to lose its 
origins, of being ‘laundered’ and itself ‘laundering’ the gains, yet risking being tainted by its 
origins – of having a bad smell. We shall show that the forms and kinds of money generated 
and used have ‘social meaning’ and not just in legal senses, but in how they are purposed, 
understood and exchanged (Zelizer, 2011). 
This book grapples with these questions. The overall aim is to investigate techniques 
of financial management in the counterfeit trade. In doing so it will suggest that the 
transnational counterfeit trade is not some ‘other economy’ run by a separate class of criminal 
actors, but rather it is intimately tied to ordinary trade, local criminal entrepreneurs and 
congeries of actors finding arbitrage opportunities created by shifting goods across consumer 
markets. Focusing on tangible goods, it addresses the ways in which capital is secured to 
allow counterfeiting businesses to be initiated and sustained, how entrepreneurs and 
customers settle payments, the costs of conducting business in the counterfeiting trade, and 
how profits from the business are spent and invested. The study covers the UK in the broader 
context of what is a distinctly transnational trade. To map the main physical and financial flows 
in counterfeit markets, the project focuses on trade with the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter, China). Not only is China a dominant manufacturing force in the global economy 
with an advanced export infrastructure, it is also the major global source of counterfeit items 
(Intellectual Property Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2015; see also Lin, 2011, 
Chaudhry & Zimmerman 2008). The study explores illicit businesses and financial flows 
between the UK and China and how they are implicated in the transnational organisation of 
the counterfeit trade (see Andreas, 1999).  
The book consists of five chapters including the introduction. Chapter 2 provides a general 
overview of the methods and data used in the study. Chapter 3 offers an account of the 
nature and dynamics of the counterfeiting business. Chapter 4 deals with the financial 
aspects of the trade in counterfeit goods. Chapter 5 outlines the main conclusions from the 
study and suggests some directions for future research in the area of counterfeit commerce. 
